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Abstract 
Why do democracies not go to war with other democracies? The idea that the internalized 
liberal-democratic norms of peaceful conflict resolution within a democratic society are 
responsible for the democratic peace, also referred to as the normative explanation, remains 
subject to a particular lack of empirical academic attention. The few studies into the 
normative explanation have not tested what should be tested: whether liberal democratic 
norms indeed affect the behavior of democratic citizens in comparison to the behavior of non-
democratic citizens. This research performs an improved empirical test and studies (1) 
whether liberal norms exist in a democracy in comparison to a non-democracy and (2) 
whether these norms have an effect on the individuals of these societies concerning the wish 
to use force in International Relations. An experimental design showed that there was no 
significant difference between a group of Dutch students and a group of Chinese students 
when it comes to the use of force in IR. A marginal effect of the regime type for the 
democratic citizens was found. Remarkably, in a comparison with the autocratic experimental 
group, these democratic citizens turned out not to be specifically more peaceful towards other 
democracies, but rather more war-prone towards autocracies. The overall conclusion of this 
study is that for both experimental groups the perception of threat was the main indicator for a 
decision to attack. This research argues that, in contrast with earlier research, there is no 
support to the claim that the normative explanation can explain the empirically found peace 
between democracies.  
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Introduction 
“Democracies do not attack each other”. President Clinton was not simply expressing 
an ideological conviction, nor did he discuss a merely academic theory in his State of the 
Union address of 1994. On the contrary, the president of the United States referred to what 
has often been called ‘the closest thing Political Science has to an empirical law’ (Levy, 
1988), namely the empirical finding that democracies do not go to war with other democracies 
(Babst, 1964). This finding, also called the ‘democratic peace’, is often interpreted by 
American and other Western policy makers as a prescription to promote democracy around 
the globe, willy-nilly, in an attempt to ‘cause’ peace (Walt, 1998, p. 39; Ish-Shalom, 2006; 
Burgos, 2008, pp. 222-223; Geis, Brock, & Müller, 2007). That interpretation, however, 
seems quite exaggerated when we consider that the democratic peace is nothing more than a 
correlation between dyads of democracies on the one hand and the absence of war on the 
other hand. Although this correlation has generally been acknowledged among most scholars, 
when it comes to a possible explanation for this democratic peace there is no consensus 
whatsoever. Put differently, the democratic peace is essentially an empirical finding without a 
clear and widely accepted explanation, and should therefore rather be referred to as the 
democratic peace thesis.   
This does not imply that there is a shortage of possible explanations; an intense 
academic debate has been going on since the 1980s about why democracies do not fight each 
other. Critics, mainly rooted within the realist school of International Relations (IR), assert 
that power politics determine inter-state relations. States deal with each other within the 
anarchic international system and must be able to defy external threats in order to survive. 
Domestic politics are therefore irrelevant when it comes to issues of national security (see e.g. 
Morgenthau, 1948/1973; Waltz, 1979; Mearsheimer, 2001; Gowa, 1999). As such, these 
critics argue that the relationship that is found between democracy and peace is a spurious 
one, and is due to a collinearity of democracy with other explanatory factors at the system-
level that determine the power relations between states, such as common interests (e.g. Farber 
& Gowa, 1997), military alliances  (Waltz, 2000; Farber & Gowa, 1995), or submittance to 
the US as a world power during and after the Cold War (Rosato, 2003). Most of these realist 
scholars claim that a war between democracies is not unlikely, if interests and/or national 
security are seriously at stake (Layne, 1994; Rosato, 2003; Morgenthau, 1948/1973; Waltz, 
2000).  
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The discovery that democracies did not go to war with each other encouraged 
proponents of the Kantian idea that a world of democracies would determine a world peace to 
challenge this hitherto dominant realist perspective of IR by arguing that it is specifically the 
nature of the democracies that causes the democratic peace (see e.g. Doyle, 1983a; Doyle, 
1983b; Doyle, 1986; Rummel, 1983; Maoz & Russett, 1993; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1999). 
After the fall of the Soviet Union, the victorious belief in the superiority of democracy of the 
Western world (see Fukuyama, 1989) created a strong increase of research into the 
Democratic Peace thesis in particular by proponents of this Kantian position (e.g. Maoz & 
Russett, 1993; Owen, 1994; Mousseau, 1997; Ray, 1998; Russett & O’Neal, 2001) that did 
not miss its effect on practical politics (Geis, Brock & Müller, 2007). These proponents, 
however, cannot conclusively agree either what specific feature of democracy causes this 
dyadic peace. Some of them argue it is all about the democratic institutions (Bueno de 
Mesquita et al., 1999), others claim that economic trading ties create peaceful relations 
(Doyle, 1997, pp. 230-248; Russett & O’Neal, 2001) and some of these proponents contend 
that it is the nature of the liberal norms of a democracy, which are created and nurtured by 
democracy itself, that causes the democratic peace (Doyle, 1986; Maoz & Russett, 1993; 
Dixon 1993).  
Although the Democratic Peace thesis is considered to be one of the ‘most productive 
[…] research programs in IR’ (Dafoe, 2011, p. 247), the academic debate that underlies the 
research program is mainly theory-driven, and most empirical evidence was generated by 
research designs that were too limited to veritably provide support for a specific explanation. 
Empirical research into an explanation for the democratic peace covers an enormous area of 
different levels of analysis, different levels of measurement and not in the least different 
ontological and epistemological positions (see e.g. Ungerer, 2012), but provides only limited 
empirical proof for any of the possible explanations.  
The idea that the internalized liberal democratic norms of peaceful conflict resolution 
within a democratic society are responsible for the democratic peace that is found, also 
referred to as the normative explanation, remains subject to a particular lack of empirical 
academic attention. As I will elaborate below, the underlying assumption of this explanation 
is that liberal democracies socialize their citizens1 into being morally better people, in 
particular in comparison with citizens of non (liberal) democracies, who are assumed not to 
have been socialized into more tolerant, more peaceful and more trusting individuals. It is 
                                                 
1
 The word citizens is used in this paper in its legal definition, which states that ‘someone is a citizens of a 
particular country when he is legally accepted as belonging to that country’ (Collins Cobuild, 2006)  
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striking that none of the few empirical studies into the normative explanation (Maoz & 
Russett, 1993; Dixon, 1993; Mousseau, 1997; Dixon & Senese, 2002; Rousseau, 2005; 
Mintz&Geva, 1993; Geva & Hanson, 1999; Tomz & Weeks, forthcoming) have tested what 
should be tested: whether liberal democratic norms indeed affect the behavior of democratic 
citizens in comparison to the behavior of non-democratic citizens. Considering the width of 
policies that promote liberal democratic norms throughout the non-democratic world (Walt, 
1998, p. 39; Ish-Shalom, 2006; Burgos, 2008, pp. 222-223), the selection bias of neglecting 
the evidence from non-democracies seems to a cause for concern.  
This research is motivated by a discomfort about this selection bias of these previous 
studies into the normative explanation and seeks to expand on these studies by arguing that 
the normative explanation of the democratic peace thesis has not yet been sufficiently tested 
for all its hypotheses, until non-democracies are also considered within the research design. 
This research therefore offers an experimental approach, in order to perform an improved 
empirical test for the normative explanation of the democratic peace thesis. Furthermore, it 
will consider the results of this research within the larger debate of the democratic peace 
thesis. Therefore, the overarching focus of this research is (1) To study whether liberal norms 
exist in a democracy in comparison to a non-democracy and (2) To study whether these norms 
have an effect on the individuals of these societies concerning the wish to use force in 
international relations.  
 
The assumed causal mechanism of liberal democratic norms and peace 
Any explanation for the democratic peace thesis must seek to explain the two 
empirical phenomena that make this thesis so intriguing but complex at the same time: (1) 
Democracies hardly ever after go to war with each other, even when conflicts have reached 
the brink of war  (Babst, 1964;  Rummel, 1983;  Layne, 1994) and (2) Democracies do go to 
war with non-democracies (Small & Singer, 1976;  Maoz & Abdolali, 1989;  Bremer, 1992; 
Mansfield & Snyder, 2005). Empirically, democracies seem to be as war-prone as non-
democracies, except when their opponent is also a democracy. The pressing question that 
needs to be answered to further our understanding of the democratic peace thesis is whether 
this peculiar peaceful behavior that only seems to occur between dyads of democracies can 
indeed be attributed to a specific quality of democracy (as argued by the proponents however 
divided they are about the specifics) or that the international system structures of the power 
politics game are responsible and have simply a collinearity with democracy (as argued by the 
critics).  
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The normative explanation seeks to answer this question in favor of democracy by 
arguing that established liberal democratic societies are specifically different from all other 
societies because their citizens are socialized with liberal norms such as tolerance, respect for 
and trust in others. This theoretical idea is rooted in the work of Enlightenment philosopher 
Immanuel Kant, who argued that liberalism would inevitably lead to a perpetual peace 
between republics2 that endorsed, nurtured and enforced liberal norms. Although it does no 
justice to his systemic line of thought to briefly summarize his rationale: Kant argued that if 
individuals would be enabled by their self-established republic to be truly free and 
autonomous, they would not only be able to pursue their own interests in a rational manner, 
but also learn to listen to the ‘the moral law inside’: the categorical imperative3. That way 
their rational act would show reciprocity towards all other free and autonomous individuals4. 
Kant assumed that republican individuals would ‘morally learn’ to be better people, or in 
other words, the act of reciprocity would become a natural reaction (Kant, 1795/2004). It is 
this Kantian idea of moral learning5 that underlies the normative explanation of the 
democratic peace thesis (e.g. Rawls, 1999; Doyle, 1983a;  Doyle, 1983b; Doyle, 1986; Doyle, 
1997; Maoz & Russett, 1993; Mousseau, 1997; Russett & O’Neal, 2001). 
The normative explanation of the democratic peace thesis assumes that the individuals 
of liberal democracies are socialized with liberal democratic norms that have taught them to 
resolve political conflicts peacefully. The logic of appropriateness (March & Olsen, 1989, p.) 
within a liberal democratic society is to be tolerant and respectful of others and to expect 
others to reciprocate tolerance and trust. This logic is also assumed applicable if a conflict 
between two democratic states reaches the brink of war; even when the threat of the conflict is 
very severe these norms of peaceful conflict resolution are assumed to guide the behavior of 
these states and the two democracies will not go to war with each other (Maoz & Russett, 
1993, p. 625; Rousseau, 2005, pp. 27-28; Dixon & Senese, 2002, p. 549; Weart, 1998). As 
long as these norms are internalized within the society, this “atmophere of  ‘live and let live’ 
                                                 
2
 Kant specifically discussed the republic, which is not the same as our contemporary liberal democracy. Most 
Kantian thinkers that are discussed in this article, however, equate Kant’s republic with democracy. For the line 
of thought of the school of the normative explanation, that difference is not of great relevance, since the focus 
lies on the liberal norms which are assumed present in Kant’s republic as well as in liberal democracies of today.  
3
 The categorical imperative is based on the maxim that one should never do something, unless he agrees that his 
deed will be allowed to be done by every other person too. This moral guideline Kant assumed to be present in 
every individual, whether they ignored it or not. 
4
 Some thinkers refer to this concept of rationality with reciprocity as reasonability (Rawls, 1971/2009, pp. 51-
94) 
5
 A good example is Kantian John Rawls who wrote: ‘Stability for the right reasons means stability brought by 
citizens acting correctly according to the appropriate principles of their sense of justice, which they have 
acquired by growing up under and participating in just institutions’ (Rawls, 1999, p. 13) 
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that leads to peaceful conflict resolution will be present at the personal, communal and 
national level” (Maoz & Russett, 1993, p. 625). Or, in other words, not only the public but 
also the political leaders will follow the logic of the liberal democratic norms and not initiate 
a war against another democracy, even when the logic of consequences would dictate a 
preemptive or even a preventive strike (Rousseau, 2005, pp. 27-28). 
An important aspect of this normative explanation is that it specifically distinguishes 
between citizens that live in a liberal democracy and citizens that live in a non-democracy. 
The latter group is assumed not to be socialized with the norms of the liberal democracy, but 
rather with the norms of zero-sum political competition. In these non-democratic societies 
opposition will often either be repressed or killed by the regime. Therefore the logic of 
appropriateness among citizens within these non-democratic societies is to use any means 
necessary in order to survive as a state within the anarchic international system. If this non-
democratic country is entangled with another country in a conflict that reaches the brink of 
war, no matter what the regime of this second country is, then its citizens will want their 
country to use force, regardless of whether or not it is used preventively (Maoz & Russett, 
1993, p. 625).   
Based on these assumptions made about the non-democratic society, the normative 
explanation expects that if democratic citizens face a severe conflict with an non-democracy 
at the brink of war, they will be more likely to want to use force than in the case where the 
other country is democratic. In the former case the democratic citizens will feel that a 
preventive strike in self-defense is necessary, since they do not share their peaceful norms 
with these non-democracies and can therefore expect to be attacked (Maoz & Russett, 1993, 
p. 625). The logic of appropriateness is now, also for these democratic citizens, to adapt to the 
‘violent norms’ of the non-democracy.  
 The normative explanation makes a specific distinction between a democracy and a 
non-democracy. It has high expectations for the effect of democracy on its citizens, in 
particular in comparison with a non-democracy. However, the democracy as described by the 
normative explanation is not just any democracy. The ‘peace-causing’ democracy is supposed 
to be a liberal society that enables its citizens to be free and autonomous, or in other words, a 
so called liberal democracy in which, next to the democratic institutions, the universal human 
rights and civic liberties are ensured (see e.g. Sartori, 1987, pp. 184; Merkel, 2010, pp. 38-42, 
Møller & Skaaning, 2010, p. 263). If we accept this specific definition of a democracy, then 
according to the theoretical framework of the normative explanation, any other regime can be 
categorized as a non-democracy. Many forms of non-democracy could be hypothesized: most 
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obvious is the autocracy, led by a dictator, a single-party, a religious leader(s) or a military 
junta. Also a hybrid regime, which combines democratic and autocratic features and is often 
quite stable in its prevailing powers (Bogaards, 2009; Morlino, 2009), seems a likely 
candidate to be conceptualized as a non-democracy. But also the new democracy that still 
needs time to socialize its citizens with liberal norms can then be considered a non-democracy 
(Gibson & Duch, 1993; Booth & Bayer Richard, 1996). The normative explanation, however, 
mentions explicitly the zero-sum political competition that leads to repression and even 
political deaths within a non-democracy (see e.g. Maoz & Russett, 1993, p.625), which 
indicates specifically a repressive autocratic country. No possible nuances or different 
conceptualizations are mentioned, apparently a society is either “enlightened” or not. The use 
of a container concept for non-democracies is a first indicator of the selection bias that is 
categorical for the normative explanation; it posits exaggerated expectations for the liberal 
democracy in comparison with the non-specified and unclear conceptualization of non-
democracies. For the purpose of this research, nevertheless, the ‘black and white’ 
conceptualization of the normative explanation will be followed: a ‘democracy’ is a liberal 
democracy and a non-democracy is considered an ‘autocracy’. Citizens that are born and 
raised within a democracy are assumed to have the liberal democratic norms internalized and 
are therefore for this research referred to as ‘democratic citizens’. Conversely, citizens that are 
born and raised within an autocracy are assumed to lack internalized liberal norms and are 
therefore referred to as ‘autocratic citizens’.  
 
An assessment of the normative explanation 
The first hypothesis of the normative explanation is that no matter how severe a threat 
of a conflict between two democracies is, its citizens will not want to go to war with another 
democracy (Maoz & Russett, 1993, p. 625; Mousseau, 1997, p. 74). Although empirically 
speaking there is no trackrecord of recent wars between democracies (Rousseau, 2005, p. 19), 
the question is whether a democratic war is indeed an impossibillity? Several realist scholars 
have argued that a war between democracies is not unlikely. What if common interests of two 
democracies are seriously at stake (Farber & Gowa, 1995; Farber & Gowa, 1997)? What if 
Japan becomes a great power challenger of the United States (Layne, 1994, p. 48)?  What if 
the current economic crisis breaks down the European Union? Will Germany and France then 
resume their old quarrels? What if a conflict about interests between two democracies gets 
seriously out of hand and the threat of this conflict is immense? Will the logic of 
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appropriateness lead the citizens of these countries into peaceful negotiations or will they 
want to defend their country and use force? The normative explanation expects that no matter 
how high the threat of the conflict is, democratic citizens will not want to go to war with 
another democracy. 
Secondly, it is hypothesized that for non-democratic citizens knowledge about the 
regime does not matter at all. For these citizens, only the threat is of importance when 
deciding to go to war or not (Maoz & Russett, 1993, p. 625; Mousseau, 1997, p. 74). The 
question is whether the often used assumption that autocracies are war-prone towards other 
countries, no matter the regime, can be corroborated for the microlevel. Empirical evidence 
shows not only that autocratic countries are not always as war-prone as anticipated within the 
normative explanation, in particular when the other country is also an autocracy; autocracies 
show significant difference in conflict initiation (Peceny, Beer & Sanchez-Terry, 2002; 
Bennett & Stam, 2004; Weeks, 2012). A test of this hypothesis for the microlevel is therefore 
of great importance, since empirical evidence has also shown that autocratic audiences are of 
influence on foreign policy decisionmaking of the autocratic elite (Weeks, 2012).       
The third hypothesis is that democratic citizens are willing to attack an autocracy, if 
the threat of the conflict is severe (Maoz & Russett, 1993, p. 625). The idea is that the 
democratic citizens will have to adapt to the nature of the more violent assumed autocracies, 
which are assumed to be more violent because they are assumed to lack liberal norms (Maoz 
&Russett, 1993, p. 625; Rousseau, 1996, pp. 526-527). When we consider these three 
hypotheses together, they are basically drawn from the same question: if a conflict is severe 
and of great threat, at the brink of war, does the factor ‘regime’ matter or not?  
Fourthly, it is hypothesized that the democratic citizens have internalized liberal norms 
of tolerance and reciprocity, whereas the autocratic citizens lack these liberal norms. Fifthly, 
it is hypothesized that these liberal norms are of influence on the democratic citizens when it 
comes to their wish to attack a democracy or not. Subsequently, even if the autocratic citizens 
would have liberal norms, then these should not affect their decisionmaking in any case. The 
question underlying these hypotheses is whether social norms have been internalized or not 
and whether these norms are of any influence on the wish of citizens to attack or not (Maoz & 
Russett, 1993, p. 625; Mousseau, 1997, p.74). If liberal norms are indeed internalized by 
democratic citizens and if these liberal norms indeed affect the democratic citizens when it 
comes to their ideas about the use of force, then other possible micro-level explanatory factors 
would not be of any influence on democratic citizens, whereas these possible factors might 
still be able to affect the decision of autocratic citizens.  
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This design has been chosen to control for two possible micro-level explanatory 
factors that theoretically might influence decisions about the use of force. The first factor is 
the gender of the participant. Women are often considered to be less inclined to use force than 
men (Tessler & Warriner, 1997). Some feminist theorists argue that it is due to the maternal 
instincts of women that they are more inclined to peaceful conflict resolving. Others of the 
feminist school state that it is the male-dominated culture of politics, international relations 
and the use of force that has forced women to find other (more peaceful) means to come to 
conflict resolutions (Tessler, Nachtwey, & Grant, 1999). Contradicting evidence was found 
for specific populations, where women turned out to be more violent than men (Tessler, 
Nachtwey, & Grant, 1999), but even when the outcome is reverse, a gender difference is 
suggested to exist.  
Smith has shown that although there is some evidence for differences between men 
and women when it comes to the use of force, the context of society is of importance: ‘Gender 
differences on violence seem to decrease where a social norm exists and tend to increase in 
situations where society has not promulgated clear and established standards’ (1984, p. 385). 
Relying on these insights, we can expect that any gender effect must be dissolved by the 
presence of liberal norms for the democratic citizens, but for the non-democratic citizens, 
whose norms are not shaped by liberal democracy, the gender effect might still in effect.  
The second possible micro-level explanatory factor that is supposed to be dissolved by 
the liberal norms in a democracy is the position one takes on the hawk-dove dimension. This 
dimension is often used to indicate whether individuals are more inclined to use force (a 
hawk) or to cooperate (a dove) to solve conflict situations (Bar-Tal, Raviv, & Freund, 1994; 
D'Agostino, 1995). Given the expectation that the liberal norms in a democracy would dictate 
the logic of appropriateness, we should expect that this logic would also rule out individual 
tendencies of democratic citizens for hawkish behavior, in particular towards democracies. In 
a non-democratic country, however, the same logic would lead us to expect that hawks would 
not be restricted by any social norm to wish to decide like a hawk and therefore hawks would 
be more inclined to use force than doves. Braumoeller (1997) has shown that in the former 
Soviet countries liberal norms started to develop similar to the norms in the established 
democracies, but that these were not (yet) of influence on a moderation of hawkish behavior. 
This seems to be in line with the expectations posed by the normative explanation that liberal 
norms need some time to develop and internalize, but the moment this process is consolidated 
they should overrule other possible explanatory factors at the micro-level.   
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Testing the arguments 
There have been some empirical studies into the normative explanation (Dixon, 1993; 
Maoz & Russett, 1993; Mousseau 1997; Dixon & Senese, 2002; Rousseau, 2005; Mintz & 
Geva, 1993; Geva & Hanson, 1999; Tomz & Weeks, forthcoming). Strikingly, none of these 
studies have considered the full hypothetical implications of the normative explanation. Their 
research designs have all suffered from the same selection bias: no empirical tests have been 
conducted for the expectations of the autocracies. Of these studies, the work of Maoz & 
Russett is generally considered to have performed the most sophisticated test of the normative 
explanation (Rousseau, 2005, p. 202). Within the Democratic Peace thesis literature, their 
article has been cited most frequently (well over 500 times6) as a robust test of the normative 
explanation since they wrote it in 1993. Maoz & Russett have tested the hypotheses for the 
normative explanation with a correlational design in which firstly dyads of democracies are 
considered per year to see whether they were engaged in a military dispute and secondly 
whether explanatory factors are significantly related to these outcomes.  
Maoz & Russett have used two measures for liberal norms: stability and political 
deaths. The first measure relies on the number of years a democracy exists Maoz & Russett 
have assumed that the longer a democratic regime exists, the more likely it is that the liberal 
norms belonging to the democracy will be internalized. The second measure is based on the 
number of political deaths within a year for each of the dyads. Thereby Maoz & Russett have 
assumed that the stronger liberal norms are internalized, the more likely it is that domestic 
political conflicts will be resolved peacefully. Their research design has controlled for other 
potentially confounding factors, such as wealth, military power, military alliances, contiguity, 
economic growth and institutional factors (Maoz & Russett, 1993, p. 630). Their results have 
indicated that the regime factor of a democratic dyad has a consistent effect on the use of 
force between states. The measure for liberal norms has shown to be a significant explanation 
for the absence of force between democracies and was considered robust. Maoz & Russett 
have concluded their famous article with the Kantian hope for the future that the more states 
will be democratic, the less it will be necessary for states to adapt to the rules of the 
Hobbesian anarchic international system and an enduring peace can be realized (1993, p. 
637).  
 The results of Maoz & Russett have contributed substantively to the debate about the 
democratic peace thesis. However, they were not able to provide sufficient empirical support 
                                                 
6
 Web of Science, June 2012. 
Femke Avtalyon-Bakker 
- 15 - 
for the normative explanation. Not all the assumptions of the normative explanation as 
hypothesized by Maoz & Russett have been tested and furthermore, their test was unable to 
isolate the causal mechanism. In other words, the correlational design of Maoz & Russett did 
not test what it should have tested: whether democratic norms indeed affect the behavior of 
individuals in a democracy in comparison to the behavior of individuals in non-democracies, 
in particular when they have information about the nature of the other regime. This selection 
bias is shown by pointing at three inaccuracies of the research design of Maoz & Russett, but 
these are categorical for most research into the normative explanation.  
Firstly, Maoz & Russett have focused only on one part of its design: the peace 
between democracies. The analysis leaves out possible peaceful relations between other 
dyads, such as a dyad of a democracy and a non-democracy or of two non-democracies, 
which could test the assumptions of the whole model (Rousseau, 2005, p. 202), just like 
Dixon (1993) and Mousseau (1997) did.   
Secondly, the research designs of the correlational studies into the normative 
explanation suffer from an ecological inference problem (Robinson, 1950), by assuming that 
the causal mechanism of the aggregated level proves the existence of the same causal 
mechanism at the individual level (e.g. Maoz & Russett, 1993; Dixon, 1993; Mousseau, 
1997). This ecological inference problem has been acknowledged by a few scholars who have 
used an experimental approach to test the normative explanation for the individual level. 
Mintz and Geva (1993), for instance, have manipulated the explanatory factor regime type for 
three experimental groups of democratic citizens and have found evidence that these citizens 
were indeed less inclined to go to war with democracies than with autocracies. These citizens 
furthermore perceived a war with a democracy as a policy mistake of their political leaders. 
 Geva and Hanson (1999) conducted a somewhat similar experiment in which they 
manipulated the perception of regime type, in relation to the perception of cultural similarity 
between two countries. They have found that a perception of cultural similarity leads to 
citizens assigning their adversary a democratic status, similar to their own. On top of that, 
these democratic citizens were less likely to support an attack if they perceived the other 
country as a democracy. Rousseau (2005) and Tomz & Weeks (forthcoming) have also tested 
whether democratic citizens are more inclined to work out a severe conflict more peacefully 
with a democracy than with an autocracy, by using an experimental approach. Their findings 
offers a corroboration of the assumed behavior of democratic citizens: these citizens seemed 
to be less willing to go to war with a democracy than with an autocracy.  
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However, despite these corroborating results, the claim that democratic norms are 
indeed responsible for that peaceful behavior is not supported until we have tested all 
hypotheses, including the norms and behavior of autocratic citizens. The four experimental 
studies described above have, just like Maoz & Russett, selected only one part of the 
independent variable: their experiments lack a test of how autocratic citizens act within a 
similar situation and have therefore failed to test firstly whether these autocratic societies 
indeed lack liberal norms and secondly whether these autocratic citizens are more war-prone, 
regardless of the nature of the opposing regimes. Subsequently the third criticism on these 
studies is that the measure used for liberal norms is flawed: the proxy of regime years and 
political deaths, which was used by Maoz & Russett (1993, p. 630), is supposed to represent 
an assumed effect of the assumed presence of assumed liberal norms. Although in social 
sciences we cannot always escape the use of proxies, the proxy used by Maoz & Russett is in 
particularly problematic. It assumes already present what is supposed to be tested empirically: 
the actual presence of liberal norms and their possible influence on decisions about the use of 
force in International Relations.  
  
Method and Data collection 
This research offers such an empirical test. It builds on these previous studies and uses 
an experimental approach to offer an improved test for the micro-level, by comparing the 
liberal norms and their consequences for willingness to agree to the use of force between 
democratic citizens on the one hand and autocratic citizens on the other. An experimental 
design is perfectly suited for this research to provide causal insights which could not have 
been derived from the existing and aggregated data (McDermott, 2011, p. 504). It offers 
methodological control of the independent and dependent variables, and the randomization of 
different decision-scenarios about war and peace provides a way to control alternative 
explanations as well. Recently, the experimental approach has been used more frequently in 
IR studies because it can ‘test theoretically derived models and generate data’ (Mintz, Yang, 
& McDermott, 2011, p. 493). Experiments are an excellent instrument to generate knowledge 
about the crucial foundations of the normative explanation of the democratic peace, in 
particular because these foundations rest on assumptions made about the micro-level for 
different societies. A systematic test of these foundations can facilitate the building of a 
stronger and possibly revised theory (McDermott, 2011, pp. 504-505).  
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Experimental design 
 The experimental design for this research tests whether the information about regime, 
the perception of threat, liberal norms and individually-based attitudes affect the decision-
making of democratic and autocratic citizens towards the use of force in IR. Therefore a 
quasi-experiment is used in which participants of two different societies are exposed to a 
thought-experiment. To ensure that a comparison can be made between democratic citizens 
and autocratic citizens, the participants have to be born and raised in either a democracy or an 
autocracy and were therefore non-randomly assigned to one of the two experimental groups.  
In the winter of 2012 the experiment was conducted for two experimental groups, a 
democratic and an autocratic one. The democratic experimental group consisted of 167 
freshmen students of Political Science at Leiden University in the Netherlands, of whom 87 
are male and 80 are female. These 167 participants were all born and raised in the Netherlands 
or another established Western democracy7. The autocratic group exists of 187 undergraduate 
students of the Communication University of China (CUC) in Beijing, China.  This group 
consisted of 65 males and 122 females, who were all born and raised in China8. The 
participants of both experimental groups are between the ages of 17 and 26 years old. These 
participants were asked at the end of their class whether they would like to volunteer to 
participate in a research. At the time, it was stressed that the survey was conducted completely 
anonymously, with no ways to connect the answers to individuals. For the students who 
decided to participate, a paper-and-pencil-experiment was conducted. Each experimental 
group was exposed to exactly the same scenario9, but in their own language: Dutch and 
Mandarin Chinese, respectively. After the experiment, the students were debriefed about the 
aim of this research. 
In the abstract scenario that was offerend to the experimental groups, two fictitious 
countries are entangled in a territorial clash that, after several diplomatic attempts, gets 
seriously out of hand and is at the brink of war. The participants are asked to advice their 
government about the next step towards the other country: to attack in a pre-emptive strike or 
to make another attempt to negotiate. The scenario10 varies the regime type for four groups, to 
which the participants of each experimental group are randomly assigned within their 
experimental group. Groups I and II receive information about the democratic nature of the 
                                                 
7
 Of the total sample of the group of 172 participant, 5 were not born and raised in an established liberal 
democracy, and were therefore excluded from the sample. 
8
 Of the total sample of the group of 189 participant, 2 were not born and raised in China, and were therefore 
excluded from the sample. 
9
 Inspired by Geva & Hanson, 1999. 
10
 See appendix 1 for the scenario and questionnaire of the post-test. 
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government of the other country and its civil liberties and rights for the opposing country. 
Only group II is also given the expectations of the democratic regime (based on the 
expectations of  the normative explanation). Group III and IV receive  information about the 
autocratic nature of the government of the other country, with limited and uncertain civil 
rights. Only group IV also receives the expectations for the behavior of the autocracy (based 
on the expectations of the normative explanation).  
The use of the extra groups II and IV is to provide an extra manipulation check, to 
ensure that the manipulation of regime has been effective. For the democratic experimental 
group no significant difference is found between the outcomes of the participants of group I 
and II, which means that the regime manipulation of ‘democracy’ is received as anticipated by 
the research design. The same goes for the autocratic experimental group, in which no 
significant difference was found between group III and IV. Thus, the manipulation of the 
factor ‘regime’ can be assumed to be perceived as anticipated by the experimental design. For 
the remainder of this research, a new manipulation variable for regime is created: groups I and 
II are brought together into the manipuation-factor ‘democracy’ and groups III and IV are 
brought together into the manipulation-factor ‘autocracy’. This way a 2x2 factorial design 
could be used for analyses. For the Dutch experimental group 86 participants have been 
exposed to a scenario where the opposing country is described as a democracy, and 81 have 
been exposed to the description of an autocracy. In the Chinese group 95 participants were 
exposed to the democracy-scenario and 94 to the autocracy-scenario.  
The two hypothetical countries of the scenario are described in such a way that system 
level explanatory factors are kept as constant as possible: the military power, the economic 
development and thriving economic situation, the available natural resources, the population 
size and the geografical positioning are described similar to each other. Besides that, it is 
specifically noted that both countries are very similar in many respects. The choice for 
hypothetical countries in combination with a similar description of system level factors is 
specifically meant to reduce the chance that a participant will consider the system level 
factors of his own country as guiding his decision-making. By describing the system level 
factors similarly for both hypothetical countries, the participants must be able to focus solely 
on the direct manipulations of the regime of the other country and perceive the direct threat of 
the conflict, without assuming other explanatory factors to be relevant for the hypothetical 
conflict at hand.    
In order to understand the decision the participants have in connection to the 
hypothesis, it is of great importance to understand whether the participants have perceived the 
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conflict described in the scenario as severe, at the brink of war. The perception of the threat of 
the conflict is measured in a post-test, by asking the participants to assess the likeliness of the 
other country’s attack on a 4-point Likert scale. Participants that indicated that a possible 
attack of the other country to be ‘(very) unlikely’ are coded as having a low threat perception 
and the participants that indicated to have expected the other country to attack to be ‘(very) 
likely’ are coded to have a high threat perception. The Dutch group has now 73 participants 
that have perceive the threat as non-severe, and 94 with a severe threat perception. From the 
Chinese group 61 participants have perceived the threat as non-severe, and 126 have 
perceived it as severe. This backward-deducted test of the threat perception is used further on 
as an additional manipulation for the perception of threat of the participants. Furthermore, the 
post-test conducts background checks for gender, country of birth and lifelong citizenship. 
The latter two are both necessary checks for the assessment whether these individuals are 
indeed democratic or autocratic, respectively, according to the definitions used in this 
research.  
 
Liberal norms and hawks & doves 
The post-test concludes with a survey-based questionnaire that measures the personal 
attitudes of the participants, which are used to assess the level of endorsement of liberal 
norms and a position on the hawk-dove dimension for every participant. The measure for 
liberal norms for this research is based on the expected effect of living within a liberal society, 
in which its citizens are hypothesized to become more tolerant towards other democratic 
citizens, to feel more interpersonal trust with democratic citizens and experience a higher 
feeling of stability in their lives, in contrast with the expected effect of living in an autocratic 
country, which is hypothesized to create a lack of tolerance and interpersonal trust with any 
other person and a low level of stability as a consequence (Maoz & Russett, 1993, p. 625). 
These three items together form the measure for liberal norms. 
The items used to construct this measure of liberal norms rely on the literature of 
liberal-democratic values within the former Soviet Union and Latin-America. Schedler & 
Sarsfield (2007) have shown that support for democratic values cannot be measured by 
directly asking participants: more often than not this way of measuring has led to non-
attitudes, namely ‘paying lipservice to democracy’ (Schedler & Sarsfield, 2007, p. 638). For 
this research, in particular the experiment that is conducted within an autocratic country, it is 
of great importance to measure the endorsement of the practice of norms. Besides, asking 
respondents aftre their personal attitudes seems more likely to be answered truthfully than 
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questions about the support for institutions and political elites. Schedler & Sarsfield argue that 
indirect questions at the personal level can measure an endorsement for the practical reality of 
liberal values, and can therefore offer a better measure for democratic values. This argument 
is supported by an investigation of the liberal values of Mexican individuals (pp. 654-655). 
The rationale of Schedler & Sarsfield’s measure is in line with the work of Gibson and Duch 
(1993) who have assessed the support for the liberal-democracy in the former Soviet Union 
during the democratization process in the 1990s by measuring the ‘applied liberal-democratic 
value’ of political tolerance (1993). Following this line of thought, the items used to measure 
the level of liberal norms for every participant rely on the endorsement of several liberal 
items11.  
To operationalize the liberal norms measure 12, a principal component analysis (PCA) 
was used to perform an initial exploration into the items that could form components. 
Secondly, the items that form a component together where tested for reliability with a 
Mokken Scale analysis13. To come to a construct of liberal norms three scales were 
developed; tolerance, trust and stability. The tolerance scale was formed of five items that 
delivered, when combined, a good reliability score of .33 on the Mokken Scale. For the 
measure of trust, three items were used to form a scale. Although the PCA loadings were 
sufficient, the Mokken Scale reliability score of .22 was somewhat low. Nevertheless, the 
measure was used, since the items were theoretically relevant and with the available data 
these three items together showed the highest reliability for this measurement. For the 
measure of stability, three items with a reliability score of .43 in the Mokken scale analysis 
were used to build the scale. To create one measure for liberal norms, a PCA showed 
sufficient support to combine the scales of tolerance, trust and stability into a new variable.  
For every participant a score for liberal norms was calculated, with a range from 1 
(very low level of liberal norms) to 5 (very high level of liberal norms). For analytical 
purposes, the variable liberal norms is transformed into a dichotomous variable with a median 
cutoff point (3.67) to separate between participants who have a low score of liberal norms and 
those that have a high score of liberal norms.  
A similar line of procedure is followed to measure the position on the hawk-dove 
dimension. The endorsement of the practical reality of a hawkish attitude is measured: a hawk 
                                                 
11
 To give one example, the participants are asked to indicate on a 5 point Likert scale whether they would allow 
gay individual to participate politically.   
12
 See appendix 2 for an overview of the measurement of liberal norms and the hawk/dove dimension. 
13
 Mokken scale analysis is a nonprobabilistic measurement to reduce data to a single dimension. The Mokken 
scale analysis is particularly well suited to test the reliability of scales of items that are designed to measure 
attitudes of latent variables  (Van Schuur, 2003)  
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is more inclined to use force when it comes to conflict resolution, a dove is less willing to use 
force when it comes to conflict resolution (Klugman, 1985; Maoz I., 2003). Earlier research 
of hawkish positions was often related to the position a participant could take in an actual 
conflict14. For this research that approach is not applicable, so the items have to be measured 
in a more general way. Several questions have therefore measured the willingness of the 
participants to use force for conflict management on the personal and state level, but not 
specifically connected to actual conflicts. The hawk-dove-measure is subsequently 
operationalized following the same procedure described above. Three items formed a reliable 
scale together (.34 using Mokken scale analysis).  
For every participant a score for the hawk-dove-dimension was calculated with a range 
of 1 (very dovish) to 5 (very hawkish). The variable hawk-dove is transformed to a 
dichotomous variable for analytical purposes. A median cutoff point (3.33) is used and the 
participants are thereby separated into doves and hawks.   
 
Data Analysis 
Threat, Regime and Country 
 The core of the normative explanation expects to see a difference between democratic 
citizens and autocratic citizens, when it comes to the use of force under severe threat, in 
particular when a distinction is made in the regime type of the ‘other country’. Democratic 
citizens, knowing their country to be under severe threat, are expected to be unlikely to argue 
for attacking democracy, but likely to agree to an attack on an autocracy under the same 
circumstances. Autocratic citizens, on the other hand, are expected to be very likely to 
promote the attack strategy against any regime, if their country is under severe threat. Which 
subsequently means that if their country is at the brink of war, these autocratic citizens will be 
more likely to support an attack on a democracy than democratic citizens under severe threat. 
Following this logic, democratic citizens at the brink of war will be just as likely as autocratic 
citizens to support attacking  an autocracy. 
 To test these assumptions, the results of the experiment are brought together in figure 
1, which shows the frequencies (in percentages) of participants who decided to attack. A 
distinction is made between the Dutch experimental group and the Chinese experimental 
group, between the groups that were exposed to the regime type manipulation of democracy 
and autocracy, and between the different levels of threat perception. At first glance, figure 1 
                                                 
14
 E.g. the position in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. (Maoz I., 2003) 
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suggests that the expectation that democratic citizens are unlikely to support an attack on a 
democracy can be refuted. If the threat is perceived as severe, the Dutch group is about 7 
times more likely to attack a democracy than when the threat is not perceived as severe, which 
is supported by a Chi-square test (χ² = 9.675, p < .01, Cramer’s V =  .343, Odds Ratio = 6.99). 
However, if the other country is an autocracy, then the Dutch group is about 14.7 times more 
likely to support an attack (χ² = 16.139, p < .001, Cramer’s V = .458, Odds Ratio = 14.67), 
which seems to indicate that regime does matter for this democratic experimental group.  
However, when the difference in the frequency of attack (when the threat is perceived 
as severe) is compared between the wish to attack an autocracy over a democracy with a Chi-
square test, no significant difference is found (χ² = 3.573, n/s). Concluding for the democratic 
experimental group it seems that although the regime type seems to have some (but non-
significant) influence, the threat perception of the conflict offers a very good explanation for 
the decision to attack any regime; under high threat, the Dutch group is almost 11 times more 
likely to support an attack, no matter the regime op the opposing country (χ² = 28.139, p < 
.001, Cramer’s V = .42, Odds Ratio = 10.85).  
 
Figure 1 
                      Frequencies of decision to attack in relation to threat 
 
 Considering the autocratic citizens, first of all, the normative explanation expects them 
not to be socialized with liberal norms of peaceful conflict resolution and therefore to be more 
Threat Perception 
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war-prone. However, considering that even when their country is at the brink of war, only 
about a quarter of the autocratic experimental group is willing to attack the aggressor, whereas 
about three quarters of this group want to attempt to resume negotiations.  Secondly, when the 
results of the participants of the Chinese group that did decide to support an attack are 
analyzed, the threat perception seems to be the main explanatory factor. The Chinese group is 
about 3.5 times more likely to support an attack on any regime when the threat is severe (χ² = 
8.406, p < .01, Cramer’s V = .21, Odds Ratio = 3.45). Furthermore, regime type does not 
seem to matter much. Although visually a slight difference seems to indicate that the Chinese 
group is more likely to support attacking an autocracy over a democracy when severity of the 
threat is perceived to be low, a Chi-square does not support this notion (χ² =1.141, n/s).  
The first conclusion is that for both experimental groups, within their groups, threat is 
the main explanatory factor to support an attack. The normative explanation also expects to 
see a difference between groups in the decision to attack between the democratic citizens and 
the autocratic citizens, but only in the case of the other country being a democracy. The 
results suggest that this expectation can be refuted. First of all, the results show that the 
democratic experimental group, when under severe threat, is also willing to attack no matter 
the regime, just as the autocratic experimental group is. Moreover, the democratic 
experimental group is just as likely to support an attack on a democracy if it is under severe 
threat as the autocratic experimental group is. However, when we compare the frequency with 
the Dutch group wants to attack with the frequency of the Chinese group, we see that the 
Dutch group is almost 2 times more likely to attack, when under threat than the Chinese group  
(χ² = 5.219, p < .05, Cramer’s V = .16, Odds Ratio = 1.92). Furthermore, when we consider 
the knowledge about the regime type (when under severe threat), we can see that the factor 
democracy does indeed not account for any difference, but autocracy does. The democratic 
experimental group is almost 3 times more likely to support an attack on an autocracy, when 
under severe threat, than the autocratic experimental group (χ² = 6.436, p < .05, Cramer’s V = 
Odds Ratio = 2.70).   
 Concluding for now, it seems that the expected peacefulness of the democratic 
experimental group towards democracies does not find any support. This democratic group 
turned out to be just as likely to attack, if not more so, as the autocratic group. Moreover, 
regime type as explanatory factor did have some influence and indeed only for the democratic 
experimental group, but the effect was marginal and, more importantly, it was not the 
knowledge about the democratic nature that made the democratic experimental group more 
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peaceful, it was the knowledge about the autocratic nature of the opponent that made this 
democratic group more war-prone.  
 
Liberal norms 
 The normative explanation expects democratic citizens to have internalized liberal 
norms, in comparison with autocratic citizens who lack these norms. Furthermore, it is 
expected that the democratic citizens’ decision to not attack a democracy, even when the 
threat is high, is a causal effect of the internalized liberal norms. Conversely, it is expected 
that even when the autocratic citizens do endorse liberal norms, these will be of no 
consequence for their decision to attack or not.  
 To test these assumptions, first of all, the mean level of liberal norms is measured for 
each experimental group. The Chinese group has a mean of 3.47, which does not seem as low 
as expected by the normative explanation, considering it is only just below the overall median 
of 3.67. Apparently these autocratic citizens do endorse liberal norms to a certain extent. The 
mean of the Dutch group is 3.84, which seems to be somewhat low, according to expectations. 
It furthermore seems only marginally higher than the mean of the Chinese group. However, a 
t-test shows a significant difference for the means of both groups (F = .681, n/s, t (341.9) = 
2.292, p < .001, lower CI = .293, upper CI = .450, r = .20). This indicates that liberal norms 
are endorsed differently within each experimental group. Nevertheless, the small to medium 
effect indicates that the difference is not as large as was previously assumed. 
Knowing that, to a certain extent, both experimental groups have shown to endorse 
liberal norms, the question is whether these norms had any relation to their decision to attack 
or not, in particular for the democratic experimental group towards another democracy. Figure 
2 shows the frequencies with which the participants decided to support an attack, 
distinguished by the experimental group, the manipulation of regime type, and the level of 
liberal norms. At first glance, the liberal norms only seem to be of relevance within the 
democratic experimental group. The variance of the level of democratic norms within the 
democratic experimental group shows a relationship with the decision to support an attack on 
a specific regime type. The participants of the Dutch group who endorsed a high level of 
liberal norms were about 4.5 times more likely to attack an autocracy over a democracy (χ² = 
9.304, p < .01, Cramer’s V = .296, Odds ratio = 4.53). This finding supports the notion 
discussed above, that the democratic experimental group would be more war-prone towards 
autocracies than peaceful towards democracies. An additional test to see whether there is an 
association between threat perception of a specific regime and the level of liberal norms, 
Femke Avtalyon-Bakker 
- 25 - 
shows that the Dutch participants with a high level of liberal norms indeed perceive an 
autocracy about 2.5 times more threatening than a democracy (χ² = 5.763, p < .05, Cramer’s V 
= .228, Odds ratio = 2.55).  Moreover, the democratic participants who endorsed a high level 
of liberal norms were 4 times less likely to support an attack on a democracy than the 
democratic participants who endorsed a low level of liberal norms (χ² = 6.183, p < .05, 
Cramer’s V = .276, Odds ratio = 4). The autocratic experimental group, however, does not 
seem to have any relationship between the level of liberal norms, decision to support an 
attack, and one of the explanatory factors (threat and/or regime type).   
 
  
Figure 2 
Frequencies of decision to attack in relation to liberal norms 
    
 
Concluding for now, the democratic experimental group indeed endorsed on average a 
higher level of liberal norms in comparison with the autocratic experimental group. This 
democratic group also showed that variance of the liberal norms within the group had an 
effect. However, the finding that a variance of the liberal norms within the democratic group 
has such a strong effect seems contradictive of the normative explanation, which expects 
democratic citizens to always be of a peaceful nature towards other democracies, which seems 
Level of Liberal Norms 
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to be significantly not the case. These results can offer a rationale for the finding earlier, that 
the Dutch group was more inclined to attack an autocracy than autocratic citizens were. The 
mean of the level of liberal norms of the Chinese group lies well over the neutral value of 3. 
The weak effect size of the t-test has supported this notion. To understand what the role of 
liberal norms is within the context of this experiment, its influence must be considered within 
a multivariate model that considers all explanatory factors similarly.   
 
Other explanatory factors at the micro-level 
The normative explanation expects internalized liberal norms of democratic citizens to 
overrule any other possible explanatory factor at the individual level, which means, as 
discussed above, that for instance gender or hawkishness would not be expected to be of 
influence for the democratic citizens. For the autocratic citizens, who are supposed to lack 
these norms, these individual factors might influence their behavior when it comes to the use 
of force. To estimate the possible influence of hawkishness, the mean level of hawkishness is 
calculated. The Chinese participants turned out to be more hawkish (µ = 3.80) while the 
Dutch participants seemed to be much more dovish (µ = 2.83). These means are significantly 
different from each other, as is supported by an independent t-test with a strong effect size (F 
= .131, n/s, t (346.6) = -13.408, p < .001, lower CI = -1.003, upper CI = -.747, r = .58). When 
the relationship between hawks’ and doves’ decision to attack, the regime type of the other 
country, and the experimental group, are considered, the results in figure 3 show that it is only 
within the democratic experimental group that hawkishness seems to have an effect. Dutch 
hawks are about 2.4 times more likely to attack than Dutch doves (χ² = 5.852, p < .05, 
Cramer’s V = .192, Odds ratio = 2.39). Within the autocratic experimental group there is no 
effect of the hawkishness. A comparison between the experimental groups shows that the 
Dutch hawks are almost 4 times more likely than Chinese hawks to attack an autocracy (χ² = 
8.154, p < .01, Cramer’s V = .284, Odds ratio = 3.88). These results contradict the 
expectations. 
 The expectation concerning gender, is also refuted. The Dutch participants show a 
clear difference between men and women: the Dutch male participants are about 3.7 times 
more likely to decide to attack than the Dutch female participants (χ² = 11.837, p ≤ .001, 
Cramer’s V = .273, Odds ratio = 3.68). For the Chinese group, no significant difference is 
found (χ² = 3.192, n/s). These results show that the individual level factor gender is of 
influence, but only for the democratic experimental group. Concluding, to the contrary of 
what was expected, the individual level factors gender and hawkishness seem to be of 
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influence on the decision to attack for the democratic experimental group. Within the 
autocratic experimental group these factors did not seem to be of any influence.  
 
Figure 3 
Frequencies of decision to attack in relation to the dove-hawk dimension 
 
 
  Concluding, for both experimental groups the perception of threat is 
overwhelmingly the main explanatory factor. Regime type does seem to have a marginal 
effect only within the democratic experimental group but also seems to be conditional on the 
perception of threat. Also the variance of the endorsement of liberal norms seems to have an 
effect, but only within the democratic experimental group, similar to the way in which the 
other individually based explanatory factors of hawkishness and gender only show variance 
within this group. For the autocratic experimental group variance of these factors is indeed 
found, but these factors did not show any significant relation with the decision to attack or 
not.  
 
Multivariate test 
 These findings are corroborated within a multivariate logistic regression. The 
explanatory factors experimental group, threat, regime type, liberal norms, gender and 
hawkishness, and all theorized interaction effects (which allow for comparison between 
Dove-Hawk Dimension 
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experimental groups) are considered within the model. Diagnostics show some concerns 
about multi-collinearity, which was to be expected due to the interaction effects taken into the 
model. A residual analysis shows that there are few more outliers than would be desirable, but 
an inspection of the cases shows that these outliers are substantial, and not due to data errors. 
Considering the nature of the samples and the many explanatory factors, it is to be expected to 
have a few outliers. Therefore these cases were retained within this model. Table 1 shows the 
results of the logistic regression.   
  
Table 1 
Logistic Regression analysis for the decision to attack 
 
 95% CI for Odds Ratio 
 B (SE) Lower Odds 
Ratio 
Upper 
Country (China) 
   .810 (1.200) .214 2.247 23.593 
Regime (Autocracy) 
   .018 (1.105) .117 1.018 8.883 
Threat  
 2.294** (.750) 2.277 9.912 43.148 
Liberal Norms  -1.038    (.675) .094 .354 1.330 
Country*Regime 
   .828 (1.444) .135 2.289 38.814 
Country*Threat 
  -.569 (1.091) .067 .566 4.806 
Country* Liberal Norms 
    .897 (.890) .429 2.452 14.026 
Regime*Threat 
    .509 (1.098) .194 1.663 14.296 
Regime*Liberal Norms  
    .666 (.929) .315 1.947 12.015 
Country*Regime*Threat -1.210 (1.473) .017 .298 5.347 
Country*Regime*Liberal Norms -1.034 (1.224) .032 .355 3.915 
Hawk 
    .933  (.475) 1.002 2.542 6.447 
Gender (Male) 
  -.922*** (.290) .225 .398 .702 
Country*Hawk -1.452* (.716) .057 .234 .953 
Constant -2.233** (.763)  .107  
N = 334 
R² = .190 (Cox & Snell),  
R² = .275 (Nagelkerke).  
Model χ²(14) = 70.262, p < .001 
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
 
The logistic model provides a better fit to the data than the intercept-only model with 5.3%, 
which does not seem very much, but considering the skewed nature of the dependent variable, 
this does not come as a surprise. Most importantly, the findings of the earlier descriptive 
analyses are supported by the regression model. The explanatory factor ‘threat’ is highly 
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significant with an odds ratio of 9.91, and is therefore the strongest explanatory factor for the 
whole sample of democratic and autocratic citizens together. The interaction effect of country 
and threat is not significant which indicates that there is no difference between the democratic 
experimental group and the autocratic experimental group for the perception of threat. The 
knowledge about the regime type, the endorsement of liberal norms and being socialized 
within a specific society does not show to be a significant indicator for a decision to use force. 
Neither within the experimental groups, nor when we compare between the experimental 
groups.  
Like the finding described above, the individual level explanatory factors gender and 
being a Dutch hawk show to be significant indicators. The men from both experimental 
groups are significantly more likely to attack than the women. And also the Dutch hawks are 
significantly more likely to attack than the Dutch doves, but also than Chinese doves and 
hawks. None of the other factors are significant. Considering the whole logistic model, the 
explanatory factors for the decision to use force within IR turn out to be threat and gender for 
both experimental groups, and a hawkish position for the Dutch experimental group.   
 
Discussion 
 The causal argument of the normative explanation of the democratic peace thesis is 
built on an assumed difference in behavior between democratic citizens and autocratic 
citizens. In this research I have performed, to the best of my knowledge, the first empirical 
test that compared the effects of liberal norms on decision-making about the use of force 
between democratic citizens on the one hand and autocratic citizens on the other. An 
experimental design showed that there was no significant difference between a group of 
Dutch students and a group of Chinese students when it comes to the use of force in IR. Even 
more, for both experimental groups the perception of threat explained their decision.  
The results of this research did seem to partly support the results of previous studies 
that have claimed that democratic citizens are less likely to attack a democracy than an 
autocracy because of their internalized liberal norms (e.g. Maoz & Russett, 1993; Geva & 
Hanson, 1999; Mintz & Geva, 1993; Rousseau, 2005; Tomz & Weeks, forthcoming). 
However, these previous studies did not compare the likeliness to attack of democratic 
citizens with the likeliness to support an attack of autocratic citizens. This research did make 
this comparison that is theoretically necessary to find support for the normative explanation 
for the micro-level.  
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The conclusion of that comparison is firstly that for both experimental groups the 
perception of threat is the main indicator for a decision to attack. Secondly, there is a marginal 
effect of the regime type for the democratic citizens. Remarkably, in a comparison with the 
autocratic experimental group, these democratic citizens turn out not to be specifically more 
peaceful towards other democracies, but rather more war-prone towards autocracies. This 
effect of regime type, however, is faded out within a multivariate test that convincingly shows 
that the perception of threat is dominant as the explanation why these democratic and these 
autocratic citizens decided to support an attack. Also the endorsement of liberal norms, which 
seemed to be of marginal influence within the democratic experimental group, is faded out 
within the multivariate test. It therefore seems that the idea that democratic citizens are 
socialized with norms of peaceful conflict resolution which have an effect on the decision of 
whether or not to use force towards other democracies, is at least a bit exaggerated.  
Thus, this research argues that, in contrast with earlier research, there is no support to 
the claim that the normative explanation can explain the empirically found peace between 
democracies. This empirical test has provided us with new information about the effect of 
political systems on their citizens when it comes to their ideas about war and peace in IR. 
Although a prudent approach towards the generalizability of these results is in order, after all 
the experiment was conducted on two homogenous groups of students, a concern about the 
external validity is not completely justified. Methodologically speaking, the aim of the 
experiment is to detect an existence result: whether internalized liberal-democratic norms 
affect decision-making about war and peace. Therefore internal validity is initially of greater 
importance than external validity (Morton & Williams, 2010, pp. 331-347) However, due to 
the complexity of the testing of the liberal norms, the results from these homogeneous 
samples of students cannot be generalized.  But if we consider this empirical test as an initial 
test, it provides us with new and important insights that can be replicated for external validity 
later on. The most important contribution of this research is that it offers important evidence 
to argue that the assumed causal mechanism of the normative explanation does not function as 
was corroborated for similar homogeneous samples of democratic students15 before. The 
novelty of this research is that autocratic citizens were also considered within its design. This 
is something that should have already been considered about two decades ago. In particular 
when the results of this research are taken into account. This research can therefore be 
understood as a pilot study for improved and extended research in the near future that.  
                                                 
15
 With the exception of Tomz & Weeks (forthcoming), who used a survey experiment among democratic 
citizens to come to a representative sample of a democratic population.  
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Recommendations for new research that builds on these results would be (1) to take 
the perception of system-level factors into consideration, (2) to inquire whether the effect of 
regime type might trigger more war proneness among democratic citizens, and (3) to find out 
what role individually based explanatory factors play within the context of war and peace for 
citizens of different political systems. That threat perception turns out to be the main 
explanatory factor seems to indicate that the realist perspective, which claims that states have 
to use power politics in order to survive within the anarchic international system, has some 
influence on the micro level as well.  These results suggest a new research avenue, in which 
the perception of system-level factors is studied for the micro-level. What is exactly the role 
of threat when citizens wish to attack? When is a threat perceived? Is that connected with 
system-level factors such as military and/or economic power, or can individual level factors 
influence decisions as well?   
Considering these system-level factors, it would be also recommended to select a 
different country for the democratic population. Netherlands, being a tiny country, does not 
seem very likely to start wars just like that, whereas China with all its power in the world, not 
to mention the size and human resources, could easily go to war. Even though the countries in 
the scenario are hypothetical, it is impossible to conclusively rule out that the participants did 
not think of their own countries. This could be a valid point for concern; a replication of this 
research would preferably have to deal with representative population samples of countries 
that show variance of the independent variable liberal democratic norms, but are most similar 
when it comes to system level factors such as size, world power, military power, economic 
power, etc. On the other hand, however, if we consider that even democratic citizens of a tiny 
country such as the Netherlands are already willing to go to war when the treat is perceived to 
be high, then this may be the telling for the way in which citizens of a larger country might 
respond.  
New research should also consider again the manipulation of regime type. Although 
the factor democracy did not rule out the perception of threat and/or the wish to attack as 
anticipated by the normative explanation, the regime type democracy did had a marginal 
influence for the democratic experimental group. In the worst case that insignificant finding 
was due to the size and/or nature of this particular experiment, but a more plausible argument 
might be that regime type is a mediating factor for the threat perception of democratic 
citizens. Most importantly, the results of this research indicate that when we consider the 
effect of regime type on democratic citizens, we should not get stuck on attempts to simply 
corroborate the democratic peace thesis, but look further than that and rather inquire the effect 
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of regime type more thoroughly for individuals of different political societies and comparative 
between them.   
An additional finding that calls for further investigation is that individual features of 
the democratic experimental group are of significant influence on the decision to use force. In 
addition to that, these same features do not have the same importance for the autocratic 
experimental group. If a difference is to be found between the two experimental groups, it 
would be an indication that for the democratic participants their individual attitudes, features 
and ideas might be of some influence when they have to decide to use force, whereas the 
nondemocratic citizens of the Chinese experimental group seem to rely more on a system 
level factor such as threat to decide. Intuitively, it could be suggested that the nature of 
Chinese society, with its focus on the community rather than the individual, might have been 
of influence. Conversely, the individualistic nature of Dutch society might have been of 
influence as well. This cultural difference might tell us also more about the marginal effect 
that the presence of liberal norms seemed to have had for the democratic participants and not 
for the autocratic participants. The autocratic experimental group did not completely lack 
liberal norms, moreover and just like the democratic group, it showed variance for the level of 
liberal norms and for hawkishness. It only did not have any effect on their decision to use 
force, as was the case for the democratic experimental group. The question remains why that 
difference is found, which opens up new research perspectives in which the cultural and 
historical context of the countries are considered and not solely the nature of the political 
systems.      
Why do democracies do not go to war with each other? This question will remain 
cause for an academic debate for the years to come. This study contributes to that debate by 
arguing that there is little empirical ground for the normative explanation of the liberal school 
of IR. The results of this study indicate that previous studies into the normative explanation 
wrongly ignored the assumed variance of the independent variable of liberal-democratic 
norms. The findings of this study suggest that the perception of threat, a typical realist school 
argument, might be a better explanatory factor for the empirically found democratic peace. 
However, that suggestion is not simply a plea for the realist school arguments whereas the 
role of (international) institutions might also play an important role in dealing with that threat. 
Finding support for an attack on the micro-level, but facing a empirical reality of a lack of 
wars between democracies might indicate that the (international) institutions have been of 
influence. A research avenue into that direction, however, should not step in the same old 
pitfall to be focused merely on democracies, but should consider also variance of regime type. 
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After all, the ‘democratic peace’ might be simply a ‘peace’. How much we, in the West, like 
to think of liberal democracy as the best form of government possible, we also seem to expect 
too much from its assumed moral superiority. Rather than promoting liberal-democracy willy-
nilly around the globe, we should show a bit more prudency.  
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Appendices 
Appendix 1    Scenario 
(Number of experimental group written here)  
 
 
 
 
 
Survey 
 
In this survey some questions will be asked about your personal opinions. We are interested 
what you feel personally about a few topics. We want to stress that all your answers will be 
treated anonymously. No one will be able to connect your name to your answers; also the 
scholars that work with the data do not know these details. The names of the participants will 
also not be listed nowhere. The use of this survey is only for academic purposes and will be 
accessed only by the three people working on the research. We guarantee that no one will be 
able to connect your answers to your person. 
 
 
What do you have to do? 
On the next pages your will read a story about two countries that do not exist in real life. We want you 
to image that you are an advisor of the government of one of these countries. After reading the story, 
we will ask you to make a decision about what you read and then answer a few questions about your 
personal opinions.   
 
Please read the text carefully, before you answer the questions. 
 
For the purpose of this research, please do not discuss the survey with anybody.  
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(Vignette for thought experiment) 
(Randomly assigned:)  
(Group I & II will be exposed to the manipulation democracy) 
(Group II will be extra exposed to the expected behavior of the democracy) 
(Group III & IV will be exposed to the manipulation non-democracy) 
(Group IV will be extra exposed to the expected behavior of the non-democracy) 
 
NB: For the Chinese sample, Moereland will be called Country A, Rand’s Island will be called 
Country B.  
 
(General Text A (Manipulation of Regime)) 
 
A new conflict has occurred in the Dows Island region of the Atlantic Ocean. Since the discovery of a 
very large concentration of uranium (which forms the basis for nuclear power) near the coast of the 
island-state of Rand’s Island, the area has become very important to the world. 
 
Assume that you were living your whole life on Moereland, a neighboring island-state of Rand’s 
Island. Moereland is, just like Rand’s Island, one of the greater Islands of the Dows Island region and 
its population was counted at 19.102.307 heads at the beginning of this year. The country is 
economically well developed: It has several oilfields in the Atlantic ocean and a flourishing high tech 
industry. Besides that it has a thriving tourist sector (about 3.5 million tourists visit the country every 
year). The last decades the economy of Moereland has been growing steadily. Moereland has a well 
developed military force, there is a two year draft for every citizen when they reach the age of 18 
years.   
 
Rand’s Island resembles Moereland in many respects. Rand’s Island is about the same size and its 
population was counted at the beginning of this year at 19.987.432 heads. Its high-tech industry is 
developed well, which have kept the economy growing steadily last decades. Besides that does Rand’s 
Island quite well in the tourist sector: every year it welcomes about 3 million tourists. Also Rand’s 
Island possesses several oilfields in the Atlantic. Rand’s Island has a two year draft for all citizens at 
the age of 18 and their military forces are developed well therefore.   
 
Both countries have uranium-fields from which they are winning uranium for peaceful purposes, such 
as nuclear energy. 
 
The following text will be added to text A, only for group I & II:  
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The regime of Rand’s Island is democratically elected since its independence in 1919. All citizens from 
18 year and older can elect every four years their representatives for the parliament, from which the 
government is formed as well. Elections are considered by the citizens of Rand’s island to be fair and 
honest, they feels that they can hold its government responsible. As a result there are often changes in 
the legislative and executive powers over the decades. Freedom of speech and freedom of press are 
guaranteed in Rand’s Island on the basis of the constitution. Opposing voices within the political 
system as well as within society are not suppressed, unless the protests are violent of nature.     
 
The following text will be added only for group III & IV:  
The regime of Rand’s Island has a government that has been run since the independence of the 
country in 1919 by the same (and sole existing) party that governs the country. Elections therefore 
seem to make little difference for the inhabitants of Rand’s Island. There is only one newspaper in the 
country, which is controlled by the government. If there are any protests of opposition, these are 
mostly, although not always, suppressed by arresting many of the protesting individuals who are 
brought to prison. It is not clear what happens to them or when they will be released, which creates 
uncertainty for the inhabitants of Rand’s Island. There are strict restrictions for groups to come 
together in meetings, and they will have to be reported to the National Security Offices before 
permission is granted or not. 
 
 
General text B (conflict): 
At the moment Moereland is caught up in a severe conflict with Rand’s Island. The conflict is about 
these issues: 
 
1.  In secret, Rand’s Island started to win oil from an area which was in the territorial waters of 
Moereland.  
 
2.  In addition, Rand’s Island decided unilaterally to stop all its trade payments to Moereland. 
Rand’s Island also nationalized all assets of Moereland on Rand’s Island. The ambassador of 
Moereland was expelled by the government of Rand’s Island. 
 
3.  There is intelligence evidence that Rand’s Island has started to mobilize her military troupes 
and has started a nuclear missiles program. Although Rand’s island maintains that their 
uranium is only used for nuclear energy, the intelligence service showed conclusive evidence 
that nuclear warheads are built.    
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Rand’s Island and Moereland held negotiations for more than one week to solve these issues. But 
Moereland’s negotiators left last negotiations with the strong impression that Rand’s Island is not 
going to alter its position and informed the government of Moereland that there is a serious danger to 
be expected from Rand’s Island.  
 
The government from Moereland has been discussing the matter over the last 24 hours and has called 
you in for you advice. The government sees two possible reactions: 
 
1. To return to continue the negotiations with Rand’s Island in try to resolve these problems 
together with them, and get them to dismantle the missile program. 
 
OR 
 
2. To attack Rand’s Island with a pre-emptive strike by seizing the Capital city and its main 
seaport of Rand’s Island, in order to dismantle the missile program.    
 
**(see below for text) 
 
The Moereland government wants to know from you what the best solution is. 
** The following text will be added only for group II: 
One of the factors the Moereland government takes into consideration is that Rand’s Island has a 
democratic regime. They expect for that reason that the people and government of Rand’s Island share 
a culture of peaceful resolution of political conflicts with Moereland.  
 
** The following text will be added only for group IV: 
One of the factors the Moereland government takes into consideration is that Rand’s Island has an 
authoritarian regime. They expect for that reason that the government of Rand’s Island is used to 
resolve political conflicts with military force whenever they see necessary.  
 
 
. 
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Questionnaire 
 
 
 
1.  
Based on this information about the case of Moereland and 
Rand’s Island, what is the action you advise your government 
of Moereland to take: 
 
 
a. [   ] Attack Rand’s Island  
  
 
b. [  ] Negotiate with Rand’s Island 
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2. How likely, in your opinion, is Rand’s Island to attack Moereland? 
[ ] a. Very likely   [ ] b. Likely   [ ] c. Unlikely  [ ] d. Very unlikely   
 
3.  Imagine that you decide to attack, what in your opinion would be the most likely    
reaction of Rand’s Island to this pre-emptive strike of Moereland: 
[ ] a. Attack     [ ]  b. Return to negotiations 
4.  Imagine that you decide to negotiate, what in your opinion would be the most 
likely reaction of Rand’s Island to the call for negotiations of Moereland: 
[ ]  a. Attack      [ ]  b. Negotiate 
5 What is your age? 
 ………years old 
 
6.  I am: 
 [ ] a. Male    [ ] b Female 
 
7. In which country are you born? 
[ ] a. The Netherlands     [ ] b. China       [ ] Other country, namely ………….. 
 
8. Have you lived most of your life in: 
 [ ] a. The Netherlands    [ ] b. China        [ ] Other country, namely ………… 
  
9.  People sometimes describe themselves belonging to the working class, the middle 
class, or the upper or lower class. Would you describe yourself to: 
[ ] a. lower class    [ ] b. working class    [ ] c. middle class     [ ] d. upper class  
 
10. Do you consider yourself to be religious? 
[ ]  a. Yes    [ ]   b. No 
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The following questions 12-35 are about your personal opinions.  
For every statement we would like to know whether you strongly disagree, agree, are 
neutral, agree or strongly agree. Please check only 1 box for every statement.   
Please check only 1 box for every statement.   
a
.
 Stro
ngly
 disag
ree
 
 
b
.
 D
isag
ree
 
c
.
 N
eutral
 
d
.
 A
g
ree
 
e
.
 Stro
ngly
 ag
ree
 
11 I expect my life in 5 years to be improved strongly. 
 
     
12 I do not feel safe if I go out alone after dark. 
 
     
13 In general, I trust other people till they prove me wrong. 
 
     
14 I feel satisfied with my life. 
 
     
15 If someone starts a fight with me, I try to calm everything 
down by reasoning rather than hitting back. 
     
16 I would permit a person to say thinks on television that 
contradict my way of thinking. 
     
17 It is important to teach children tolerance and respect for 
others. 
     
18 People who are different from me, I consider to be a 
threat 
     
19 Gay people should be able to participate openly in a 
society. 
     
20 It is important to teach children to defend themselves 
physically if necessary. 
     
21 I do not like to be around people who think differently 
from me. 
     
22 People from a minority group should have the same 
rights as I have, even if I do not like them. 
     
23 If my neighbor is very different from me, I do my best to 
get to know him so I can understand him better. 
     
24 It is necessary that everyone, regardless of their views 
can express themselves freely. 
     
25 I feel completely in control over my life. 
 
     
26 Everybody thinks of themselves first, so I will have to 
protect myself and my family before I consider others. 
     
27 Problems in my life I prefer to solve myself, other people 
are only interested in their own interests. 
     
28 If I have a problem with my neighbors that is getting out 
of hand, I prefer to solve this with the help of the 
authorities rather than trying to speak with them myself. 
     
29 It is better to live in an orderly society than to allow 
people so much freedom that they can become disruptive. 
     
30 A society should not have to put up with political views 
that are different for the majority view. 
     
31 States are generally not trustworthy: they will attempt to 
expand their territory if they have the chance. 
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32 The use or threat of nuclear weapons is a necessary 
instrument for states in order to survive as a state. 
     
33 In general, international organizations are ineffective 
because they lack the power necessary to change the 
behavior of powerful states. 
     
34 It is in the best interests of states to cooperate rather than 
to fight. 
     
 
Femke Avtalyon-Bakker 
- 48 - 
Appendix 2  How to measure Liberal Norms? 
All measures for the scales exist of questions of the survey performed after the experiment, to which 
the participants could respond by indicating their opinion about this issue on a Likert scale from  [1] 
Strongly disagree – [5] Strongly agree.   
With a PCA was explored which could fall together in a single dimension. A Mokken Scale analysis 
had to confirm this and the scale was formed. The measure of Tolerance exists of 5 items: 5 questions 
asked, These five items found a reliable scale together based on a Mokken Scale Analysis. The 
measure of Trust and Stability are created in the same way. 
 
Tolerance 
 
DN6 I would permit a person to say things on television that contradicts my way of thinking.  
  
DN7 It is important to teach children tolerance and respect for others. 
 
DN9 Gay people should be able to participate openly in a society 
 
DN12 People from a minority group should have the same rights as I have, even if I do not like them. 
 
DN14 It is necessary that everyone, regardless of their views can express themselves freely.  
Reliability test 
Item Mokken scale Item H Z PCA loadings 
DN6 .34 10.90 .651 
DN7 .34 10.11 .546 
DN9 .29 9.59 .606 
DN12 .35 11.74 .602 
DN14 .32 10.76 .535 
 H = .33 Z = 16.68  
 
 
Trust 
 
DN17 Problems in my life I prefer to solve myself, other people are only interested in their 
own interests. RECODED (direction) 
 
DN21 States are generally not trustworthy: they will attempt to expand their territory if they 
have the chance. RECODED (direction) 
 
DN23 In general, international organizations are ineffective because they lack the power 
necessary to change the behavior of powerful states. RECODED (direction) 
 
Reliability test 
Item Mokken scale Item H Z PCA loadings 
DN17 .24 5.72 .589 
DN21 .21 4.97 .672 
DN23 .22 5.23 .620 
 H = .22 Z = 6.50  
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Stability 
 
DN2 If I go out after dark, I do not feel safe RECODED (direction) 
DN4 I feel satisfied with my life. 
DN15 I feel completely in control over my life. 
 
 
Reliability test 
Item Mokken scale Item H Z PCA loadings 
DN2 .36 8.65 .516 
DN4 .47 10.95 .607 
DN15 .48 11.14 .666 
 H = .43 Z = 12.47  
 
 
The scales Tolerance, Trust and Stability were computed together into one scale for 
democratic norms. A PCA supported the construct. Although details will be lost by 
considering these three important factors together in an analysis, however, taking all three 
scales into a multivariate logistic regression model with interaction effects would make the 
analysis too complicated.  
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Appendix 3 
Hawk-Dove dimension 
DN10 It is important to teach children to defend themselves physically if necessary.  
DN16 Everybody thinks of themselves first, so I will have to protect myself and my family 
before I consider others.  
DN22 The use or threat of nuclear weapons is a necessary instrument for states in order to 
survive as a state.  
Reliability test 
Item Mokken scale Item H Z PCA loadings 
DN10 .36 7.97 .747 
DN16 .32 7.53 .708 
DN22 .34 8.20 .734 
 H = .34 Z =   
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
F = .131, p > .05, t (346.6) = - 13.408, p < .001, r = .58 
